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WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT:
UNIFYING THE SPLIT IN NEW YORK’S ANALYSIS OF
IN-HOUSE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Thomas O’Connor*
As one surveys the vast and ever-changing landscape of law and
litigation, few things stand out as so unanimously exalted and
carefully guarded as the privilege protecting attorney-client
communications. Yet there is today a surprising lack of uniformity
and predictability in the reasoning by which New York courts
determine whether a communication made by in-house counsel to
its corporate client will—or will not—enjoy the protection of that
privilege. Rather than follow a single and predictable analysis to
resolve the question, New York courts have oscillated between one
line of decisions focusing primarily on the purpose of the
communication, and another in which the primary focus is on
content. This variability has created a judicial landscape where
privilege disputes virtually identical on the facts have entirely
different outcomes. Exacerbating this problem is the large number
of nonlegal functions that today’s in-house counsel perform for their
corporate clients. In the execution of these nonlegal duties, in-house
counsel often send communications that are a mix of legal and
business advice and thus fall into a gray area of the law in regards
to privilege. Without any statutory guidance to suggest otherwise,
judges must then meticulously parse through the communications at
issue and make a case-by-case determination as to whether the
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communication is mostly legal in nature, and thus protected by the
attorney-client privilege, or related mostly to business matters, and
therefore freely discoverable by opposing counsel. Two simple
solutions exist that can help restore order and predictability on this
issue in New York. By adopting a unified method of analysis that
includes consideration of both purpose and content, and by creating
a signal that explicitly denotes privileged communication between
in-house counsel and client, New York State courts can more
accurately and efficiently adjudicate this issue, and bring some
much needed uniformity and predictability to this area of the law.
INTRODUCTION
In-house counsel—counsel retained as an employee of the
corporation which it advises—employed by a corporate client turns
on its head the otherwise straightforward doctrine of attorney-client
privilege. Unlike the typical attorney-client relationship, not all
communications between in-house counsel and its corporate client
are presumptively privileged, and thus shielded, from disclosure to
an adversary in litigation.1 Rather, the privilege applies only to those
communications where in-house counsel is functioning as a legal
representative.2 Due to the growing trend of in-house counsel
assuming and performing functions which are not strictly those of a
lawyer confidentially advising a client, the question of whether to
extend the privilege to any given in-house counsel communication
has become increasingly challenging.3 The split in New York’s
judicial authority with regard to resolving the issue has only

1

See Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 540 N.E.2d 703,
705 (N.Y. 1989).
2
See Stenovich v. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 756 N.Y.S.2d 367, 376
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
3
See Jonathan C. Lipson et al., Who’s in the House? The Changing Nature
and Role of In-House and General Counsel, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 237, 237–43
(2012); see also Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 956–60 (2005) (discussing the shift in the everyday
responsibilities and functions of in-house counsel in the United States of America
that took place during the 1940s to the 1970s).
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complicated matters for lawyers trying to predict the outcome on
this critical question.4
This issue stems from the fact that the doctrine of attorney-client
privilege, a doctrine that shields communications between an
attorney and client from discovery, is simply not as sharply defined
as one might expect.5 As prevalent as the employment of in-house
counsel has become in the corporate context, New York statutes that
address the subject of attorney-client privilege fail entirely to define
how and when in-house counsel is functioning as a legal
representative to its corporate client, as opposed to functioning in
some other capacity, such as a corporate officer or business advisor.6
Importantly, the New York Court of Appeals has noted that “no
ready test exists for distinguishing between protected legal
communications and unprotected business or personal
communications.”7 As a result of this lack of statutory and judicial
direction, New York courts have routinely struggled to distinguish
between situations where in-house counsel is acting as legal
representative, and those where the function and associated
communications are more properly characterized as those of a
business advisor.8 Complicated as the challenge has been for New
4

See DeMott, supra note 3, at 967, 974.
See Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 705; see also Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v.
Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991) (discussing how no “ready
test” exists at common law in New York to determine whether the attorney-client
privilege should apply to a communication between in-house counsel and his/her
client and that the inquiry is largely “fact-specific”); Baliva v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 713 N.Y.S.2d 376 (App. Div. 2000) (finding that the inquiry as to
whether attorney-client privilege protects a communication between in-house
counsel and corporate client is “fact-specific” to each individual case); EDWARD
J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES §6.2.4 ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP (2d ed. 2016) (describing
the differing justifications for the privilege consisting of instrumental and
humanistic theories).
6
See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503 (McKinney 2016) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege applies to protected communications “made between the
attorney or his or her employee and the client in the course of professional
employment” but not further defining the term “professional employment”).
7
Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 705.
8
Compare Cooper-Rutter Assoc. v. Anchor Nat. Life. Ins. Co., 563
N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (App. Div. 1990) (“The documents, prepared more than six
months prior to the commencement of the instant action, concern both the
5
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York’s judiciary, it has given rise to a well-defined split in the
analytical approach and reasoning used by New York courts to
resolve issues of attorney-client privilege for cases involving
communications by in-house counsel.9 This split has resulted in
substantial and dangerous unpredictability when New York courts
must resolve the issue of privilege. This unpredictability, if
perpetuated and left unchecked, can only tend to inhibit the fullest
and highest function of in-house counsel, which is to provide useful
legal advice to its client.10 Certain solutions exist that, if
implemented, may work to combat this unpredictability and restore
stasis to the ways in which courts address this issue.
business and legal aspects of the defendants’ ongoing negotiations with the
plaintiff with respect to the business transaction out of which the underlying
lawsuit ultimately arose. As such, the documents were not primarily of a legal
character, but expressed substantial nonlegal concerns.”), with ABB Kent-Taylor,
Inc. v. Stallings and Co., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 53, 56–57 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (“In giving
advice to a client, the role of an attorney is certainly not restricted to citing cases
and espousing legal theories. The record here indicates the negotiations leading up to
the cancellation of the closing were protracted and, at times, acrimonious . . . the
possibility of more lawsuits loomed depending on the outcome of the asset transfer . . .
[counsel’s] legal advice to [defendant] on whether to consummate the closing,
even if such advice was based in part on [counsel’s] assessment of [plaintiff’s]
credibility or trustworthiness would, in [the court’s] view, be privileged.”). See
also Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 705 (“[N]o ready test exists for distinguishing between
protected legal communications and unprotected business or personal
communications; the inquiry is necessarily fact-specific.”).
9
As explored further below, a long line of decisions in New York have
diverged: one line of precedent focuses on the purpose of the communication at
issue, and one line of precedent focuses on the content of the communication at
issue; see Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 705; Cooper-Rutter, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 492; In re
Matter of Stenovich, 756 N.Y.S.2d 367, 376 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
10
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (“But if the purpose
of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able
to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results
in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all.”). See also Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank C. Cross, Stability, Predictability
And the Rule of Law: Stare Decisis as Reciprocity Norm, UNIV. TEX. SCH. L. 1,
https://law.utexas.edu/conferences/measuring/The%20Papers/Rule%20of%20La
w%20Conference.crosslindquist.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (“In the absence
of stability and predictability in law, citizens have difficulty managing their affairs
effectively.”).
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Part I of this Note provides an overview of the attorney-client
privilege doctrine, and explains its interpretation by New York’s
courts and legislature. Part II focuses on the history of in-house
counsel throughout the United States and the progression, as well as
regression, of duties and roles that in-house counsel have taken
within corporations. Part III explores the dual functions of today’s
in-house counsel as both legal representative and business advisor.
This part will also explore the specific roles that in-house counsel
take under these functions, and the ways in which these roles affect
in-house counsel’s ability to serve its corporate client. Part IV
explores how New York courts have applied the attorney-client
privilege to in-house counsel. Specifically, this part focuses on
several notable cases that summarize the two distinct lines of
precedent which New York courts, with no clear or discernible
reason for choosing one over the other, have followed when
applying the attorney-client privilege doctrine to communications of
in-house counsel. Conclusively, Part V proposes a two-part solution
to this issue and explains how these changes, particularly when
taken together, can restore uniformity and predictability to New
York’s decisional law on the attorney-client privilege as applied to
communications between in-house counsel and their corporate
clients.
I. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege Generally
The days when a client retained a lawyer merely to provide legal
advice or to appear in court on his behalf are long gone.11 Today,
law firms take on more roles in the representation of their client than
ever before.12 For example, firms now “find themselves rendering
11

See David E. Bland & Scott G. Johnson, Applying the Attorney-Client
Privilege to Investigations Involving Discovery: What is Fair Game in
Discovery?, in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION:
PROTECTING AND DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 271, 282 (Vincent S. Walkowiak
et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012).
12
Id.; see CARLA R. WALWORTH ET AL., PRIVILEGE LAW, ITS GLOBAL
APPLICATION, AND THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES, A.B.A MIDYEAR
CONF.
1,
7
(Feb.
3,
2012),
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investigative, as well as legal, assistance in a myriad of different
factual settings.”13 Whether the claim is breach of contract or a
shareholder derivative action, legal counsel, during its
representation of the client, often undertakes substantial
investigative work to better determine the strength of a given claim
or defense, among other tasks.14 Counsel communicates the results
of these investigations to the client and a dialogue takes place
between the attorney and client pertaining to the claims available,
the strength of those claims, as well as other issues that may arise.15
These communications are subject to attorney-client privilege and
may be protected from disclosure.16 Specifically, “[w]hen the
client’s adversary seeks discovery of the communications between
the client and the attorney . . . in subsequent litigation, a dispute
often arises as to what documents or information must be
produced.”17 Whether the communications are privileged is
generally dependent on whether counsel were, at the time the
communication was made, acting in his function as legal counsel.18
Although this may seem like a relatively simple inquiry, the
question can become extraordinarily difficult to answer when
involving in-house counsel and a corporate client.19
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/young_lawyer/attorn
eyclientprivlege.authcheckdam.pdf.
13
Bland & Johnson, supra note 11, at 282; see Carl D. Liggio, Sr., A Look
at the Role of Corporate Counsel: Back to the Future – Or Is It the Past?, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 629 (2002).
14
See Bland & Johnson, supra note 11, at 282.
15
See id. Different from work-product privilege that protects “a lawyer’s
notes, observations, thoughts and research,” the attorney-client privilege “only
protects the essence of the communications actually had by the client and lawyer
and only extends to information given for the purpose of obtaining legal
representation.” SUE MICHMERHUIZEN, CTR. FOR PROF. RESP., CONFIDENTIALITY,
PRIVILEGE: A BASIC VALUE IN TWO DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS (May 2007),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_respo
nsibility/confidentiality_or_attorney.authcheckdam.pdf.
16
See Bland & Johnson, supra note 11, at 282.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
See TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 214 F.R.D. 143, 144
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Application of th[e] [attorney-client privilege] is complicated
in situations where communications claimed to be privileged involve in-house as
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Courts and legal scholars have frequently commented on the
importance of the attorney-client privilege as an essential
characteristic of the attorney-client relationship.20 The attorneyclient privilege “provides absolute protection to most confidential
communications between clients and their lawyers.”21 One principal
goal of the doctrine is to provide peace of mind to clients.22
Specifically, “lawyers cannot help their clients if the clients worry
that third parties might later learn what clients tell their lawyers.”23
In this sense, the attorney-client privilege is similar to the physicianpatient privilege in that it promotes the exchange of information and
ensures that the patient or client will not worry about third-party
access to the disclosed information.24
Federal courts have also recognized the sanctity of attorneyclient privilege.25 Specifically, the Supreme Court of the United
States dubbed attorney-client privilege “the oldest privilege for
confidential communications known to the common law.”26 As
described by John Henry Wigmore in his renowned treatise on
evidence, attorney-client privilege applies where:

opposed to outside counsel because ‘in-house attorneys are more likely to mix
legal and business functions.’”).
20
See Sarah H. Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in
Promoting Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 989, 1008–09 (2007) (enforcing the attorney-client privilege during the
general counsel’s investigation of a corporation’s internal matters); Susanna M.
Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence in
Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 240 (2001) (maintaining the
attorney-client privilege during legal/business boardroom meetings); WALWORTH
ET AL., supra note 12 (preserving the attorney-client privilege in various
countries).
21
WALWORTH ET AL., supra note 12, at 1.
22
Id.; see People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (N.Y. 1989).
23
WALWORTH ET AL., supra note 12, at 1.
24
Privileged
Communication,
FREE
DICTIONARY,
http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/privileged+communication (last visited Sept.
10, 2016).
25
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
26
Id.
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(1) [L]egal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3)
the communications relating to that purpose, (4)
made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure
by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the
protection be waived.27
Stated differently, the attorney-client privilege protects
confidential communications by a client to an attorney made in order
to obtain legal assistance from the attorney in his or her capacity as
a legal advisor.28 Some jurisdictions have further extended privilege
to communications that consist of “advice given by the lawyer in the
course of representing the client.”29 This variation between
jurisdictions with regard to the scope of the attorney-client privilege
has resulted in significant unevenness in its statewide application.30
Equally as important to what the attorney-client privilege does
protect is what it does not.31 As the Supreme Court of the United
States made clear in its decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States, the
protection of the attorney-client privilege extends only to
communications involving the legal advice rendered by the attorney,
rather than to the facts underpinning the case itself.32 Further,
information which may be exchanged between attorney and client
will not be considered “privileged” merely because it has been
mentioned or exchanged in the course of attorney-client
communications, where that same information can be obtained from an
independent third-party source outside the attorney-client relationship.33

27

8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughten rev., 1961).
WALWORTH ET AL., supra note 12, at 1.
29
Id.
30
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396–97 (holding that questions of attorney-client
privilege will be judged on a case-by-case basis).
31
See id. at 395–96; WALWORTH ET AL., supra note 12, at 1–2.
32
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395–96; WALWORTH ET AL., supra note 12, at 1–2.
33
MICHMERHUIZEN, supra note 15 (“The underlying information is not
protected if it is available from another source. Therefore, information cannot be
placed under an evidentiary ‘cloak’ of protection simply because it has been told
to the lawyer.”).
28
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B. Attorney-Client Privilege in New York
Although Wigmore’s definition refers solely to communications
made by a client to their attorney, “the modern approach in most
U.S. jurisdictions protects communications from the lawyer as
well.”34 New York is one such jurisdiction.35 New York’s
codification of the attorney-client privilege is found in Civil Practice
Law and Rules § 4503, which states in pertinent part:
Unless the client waives the privilege, an attorney or
his or her employee . . . who obtains . . . a confidential
communication made between the attorney or his or
her employee and the client in the course of
professional employment, shall not disclose, or be
allowed to disclose such communication, nor shall
the client be compelled to disclose such
communication, in any action, disciplinary trial or
hearing, or administrative action, . . . or by the
legislature or any committee or body thereof.36
In the 1864 decision of Whiting v. Barney—one of the earliest
New York decisions which began to define the boundaries of the
attorney-client privilege—the Court of Appeals held that attorneyclient privilege extends only to communications that have some
“relation to some suit or other judicial proceeding, either existing or
contemplated.”37 Therefore, all that was required to establish privilege
under Whiting is that the communication has some relation to a judicial
proceeding, even if a judicial proceeding never took place.38
Sixteen years later, the Court of Appeals in Bacon v. Frisbie
further broadened the Whiting court’s interpretation of attorneyclient privilege.39 The Bacon court held that attorney-client privilege
extends to all communications between attorney and client when
34

Raymond L. Sweigart, Attorney-Client Privilege: Pitfalls and Pointers for
Transactional
Attorneys,
BUS.
L.
TODAY
(Apr.
2008),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_
home/gp_solo_magazine_index/bizcom_priviledge.html.
35
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503 (McKinney 2016).
36
Id.
37
Whiting v. Barney, 30 N.Y. 330, 342 (1864).
38
Id.
39
See Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394, 398 (1880).
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made in the attorney’s professional capacity.40 Specifically, the
Bacon court stated that “[a]ll communications made by a client to
his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or assistance, are
privileged.”41 Bacon clarified that communications between
attorney and client need not be related to a pending or contemplated
claim in order to be privileged.42 Rather, by extending privilege to
“any . . . matter proper for such advice or aid,”43 the Bacon court
rendered nearly every communication between an attorney and his
client privileged, and thus shielded from discovery.44 This decision
placed greater emphasis on identifying the communication’s
purpose, rather than examining its content.45 After Bacon, the
content of the communication became a distant thought, if not an
almost entirely irrelevant one, in courts’ determinations of whether
a communication was privileged.46
In 1957, almost one hundred years after Bacon was decided, the
same basic principles were reaffirmed in In re Lanza.47 Lanza
clarified that “[w]hile the right of privileged communications
between lawyer and client originally arose and extended only to
communications actually made in a pending suit, our highest courts
have broadened this view to embrace all communications.”48 Thus,
after Lanza, “all communications”—that is, any discussion at all
between attorney and client—were entitled to the privilege, whether
that discussion was regarding a legal claim or the latest ballgame.
The policy goals that New York courts sought to achieve at the
time of the Whiting and Bacon decisions played a large role in the
courts’ resolution of issues related to attorney-client privilege.49 For
many years, New York courts had interpreted the attorney-client
40

Id. at 398–99.
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 399.
44
Id. at 398.
45
See id. (emphasis added).
46
See id.
47
In re Lanza, 163 N.Y.S.2d 576, 580–81 (Sup. Ct. 1957) aff’d, 164
N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div. 1957).
48
Id. at 580.
49
See, e.g., People v. Cassas, 646 N.E.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. 1995); Rossi v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 540 N.E.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. 1989).
41

WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT 447
privilege’s rationale as helping to facilitate open, unfettered
communication between attorney and client.50 In 1989, the New
York Court of Appeals in Rossi v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Greater
New York upheld the extension of attorney-client privilege to
communications between an attorney and client.51 The court noted
that the “legislative purposes of CPLR 4503 . . . include fostering
uninhibited dialogue between lawyers and clients in their
professional engagements, thereby ultimately promoting the
administration of justice.”52 Six years later, in People v. Cassas, the
New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed this longstanding view.53
Notably, the Cassas court found that “[t]he attorney-client privilege
‘exists to ensure that one seeking legal advice will be able to confide
fully and freely in his . . . attorney, secure in the knowledge that
his . . . confidences will not later be exposed to public view to his . . .
embarrassment or legal detriment.’”54 Further, the New York Court
of Appeals explicitly recognized that the protected, confidential
quality of attorney-client communications is at the very heart of the
attorney-client relationship.55 For example, in People v. Osorio, the
court noted that the attorney-client privilege “enables one seeking
legal advice to communicate with counsel for this purpose secure in
the knowledge that the contents of the exchange will not later be
revealed against the client’s wishes.”56 These decisions made it
vividly clear that New York courts were intent on molding the
doctrine of attorney-client privilege in a way that best facilitated
communication between attorney and client.
Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court of New York
County has held that the attorney-client privilege should be
extended only where it would meet policy goals that are nearly
identical to those set forth in Rossi and Cassas.57 Specifically, the
court in Stenovich v. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz stated that
50

See, e.g., Cassas, 646 N.E.2d at 451; Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 705.
Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 706.
52
Id. at 705.
53
See Cassas, 646 N.E.2d at 451.
54
Id. (quoting In re Priest v. Hennessy, 409 N.E.2d 983, 985 (N.Y. 1980)).
55
See People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (N.Y. 1989).
56
Id.; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503 (McKinney 2016).
57
See Stenovich v. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 756 N.Y.S.2d 367, 376
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
51
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“[the attorney-client] privilege is intended to facilitate the rendition
of legal representation.”58 The court further held that the attorneyclient privilege “applies only where necessary to achieve its
purpose.”59 The policy goals behind the extension of attorney-client
privilege have been a major consideration for courts when
confronted with the issue of whether to extend privilege over
communications made between client and counsel. New York courts
have sought to apply the attorney-client privilege in ways that would
best reinforce a client’s faith and confidence in his attorney,60
thereby helping to “facilitate the rendition of legal representation,”61
and ultimately, the “administration of justice.”62
II. IN-HOUSE COUNSEL IN THE UNITED STATES
One reason why courts have been divided on how and when to
extend privilege to communications between in-house counsel and
its corporate client is because of the evolving role of in-house
counsel in corporations throughout the last century.63 The dual role
of in-house counsel as corporate advisor and attorney has been
present since the 1930s.64 At that time, in-house counsel acted as
both attorneys and business associates.65 In this dual role, in-house
counsel were “well regarded and compensated by senior
management.”66 Specifically, “[a]s ‘both business and legal
advisers,’ counsel then ‘were held in high repute.’”67 Many in-house
counsel were making “approximately sixty-five percent of the
58

Id. at 376.
Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
60
See People v. Cassas, 646 N.E.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. 1995).
61
Stenovich, 756 N.Y.S.2d at 376 (quoting Note Funding Corp. v. Bobian
Inv. Co., No. 93 CIV. 7427 (DAB), 1995 WL 662402, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,
1995)).
62
Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 540 N.E.2d 703, 705
(N.Y. 1989).
63
See Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 237–43; DeMott, supra note 3, at 958–
60.
64
See Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 238.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
DeMott, supra note 3, at 958 (quoting Liggio, Sr., supra note 13, at 621).
59
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CEO’s remuneration,”68 and were “among a corporation’s three
most highly compensated individuals.”69 In-house counsel played a
major role in a company’s leadership and their counsel and advice
were “‘regularly sought’ by members of senior management.”70
However, this level of prestige held by in-house counsel quickly
came to an end.71 By the 1940s, the prestige and status of in-house
counsel had decreased dramatically due to a growing trend on the
part of corporations to retain large outside law firms to handle their
most important legal affairs.72 As a direct consequence, the role of
in-house counsel dwindled, and the services they performed
became, with increasing frequency, limited to “handling routine
matters of corporate housekeeping”73 and “serving as liaison
between members of management and counsel’s former law firm.”74
As the duties of in-house counsel receded, so did their prestige and
compensation.75
By the 1970s, the pendulum began to swing back, with
corporations moving towards increased reliance on in-house
counsel.76 As legal costs from the use of outside firms escalated,
corporations sought to internalize and better control legal expenses
by hiring and expanding in-house legal departments.77 Specifically,
“corporate financial officers and general counsel perceived the fiscal
and professional wisdom of making salaried lawyers responsible for
the delivery of nonroutine, complex legal services.”78 Accordingly,
the United States saw a 40 percent increase in the number of
68

Id.
Id. (citing Liggio, Sr., supra note 13, at 621).
70
Id. (quoting Liggio, Sr., supra note 13 at 621).
71
See id. at 959; Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 238–39.
72
See DeMott, supra note 3, at 959.
73
Id. See also Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 238–39 (“[L]arge law firms
sought to control corporate representation, thus limiting in house counsel duties
to routine matters.” (emphasis added)).
74
DeMott, supra note 3, at 959.
75
Id. at 960.
76
Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 239.
77
Id.
78
Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering
for a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J.
1057, 1060 (1997).
69
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attorneys working in-house between 1970 and 1980.79 With the
rapid rise in the sheer number of lawyers working as in-house
counsel came greater corporate reliance on in-house legal
departments, as well as a marked expansion in their duties and
responsibilities.80 In-house counsel not only acted as a legal
representative of the corporation, but also advised the corporation as
to regulatory matters and acted as liaison between retained outside
law firms and corporate managers.81
In the 1980s, the increased cost of legal fees, heightened client
expectations to be involved in "any big strategic issue at the heart of
the organization," and stronger governmental regulations, boosted
the reliance of corporations on their in-house counsel.82 In turn,
corporate legal departments became more pronounced as further
expansion of in-house legal departments became a desirable
alternative for corporations seeking to maintain control over legal
fees, while still retaining sound and reliable legal advice.83 As a
result, the 1980s saw another sizeable increase—approximately 33
percent—in the number of lawyers working in-house in the United
States.84 In fact, even private law firms began to hire their own inhouse counsel.85
79

Id. at 1059.
See id. at 1059–60; see Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate
Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 277 (1985); Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary Law Firm Practice, 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 931, 933–34 (2002).
81
Daly, supra note 78, at 1061–62; see Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 239.
82
See Daly, supra note 78, at 1060–62; Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 239.
83
See Regan, Jr., supra note 80, at 933–34; see also Susan Hackett, Inside
Out: An Examination of Demographic Trends in the In-House Profession, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 611 (2002) (“[V]isibility of the in-house bar has grown in
recent years . . . due largely to a shift in the balance of power between outside and
in-house counsel. The move toward a client-driven marketplace and related
economic trends—whereby, increasingly, in-house lawyers call the shots . . . inhouse counsel have worked hard to improve their management skills and
economic leverage such that they have become more attractive providers of legal
services.”).
84
Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 240.
85
See Terry Carter, Counseling Counselors, ABA J. (Aug. 12, 2006),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/counseling_counselors/; Duggin,
supra note 20, at 1000–01.
80
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Subsequently, in the 1990s, an economic recession86 plagued the
United States and forced many corporations to “change [their]
expectations surrounding corporate legal functions.”87 As a result,
in-house counsel became day-to-day business and regulatory
advisors, as well as the “the guardian of the company’s reputation
and values.”88 Moreover, in-house counsel were expected to
participate in “high-level strategic decisions as . . . adviser[s] with
intimate knowledge of the corporation and its business,”89 in
addition to advising the corporation in legal matters.90
The amount of lawyers working in-house has continued to
increase to this day.91 From 1997 to 2006, “the 200 largest law
departments in the United States increased their number of in-house
counsel by an average of 4.8% per year.”92 In fact, this growth has
continued not only within the United States, but also worldwide.93
86

See John B. Taylor, Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, 39
CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB. POL’Y 195, 210 (1993),
http://web.stanford.edu/`johntayl/Papers/Discretion.PDF. Dubbed the “1990 Oil
Price Shock” by academics, a strain on the U.S. oil supply caused by the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait saw prices of oil rise from $17 per barrel in July 1990 to $36
per barrel in October 1990. Id. This dramatic increase in the price of oil resulted
in a loss of consumer and business confidence that saw unemployment in the
United States rise to a shocking 26.2 percent between 1990-1991. See Jennifer M.
Gardner, The 1990-1991 Recession: How Bad was the Labor Market?, MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 3, 7 (June 1994), http://www.bls.gov/mlr/1994/06/art1full.pdf.
87
The Evolving Role of In-House Counsel: Adding Value to the Business, GEN.
COUNS. CONSULTING, http://www.gcconsulting.com/articles/120280/73/EvolvingRole-of-In-House-Counsel-Adding-Value-to-the-Business/ (last visited Sept. 10,
2016).
88
Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 241.
89
DeMott, supra note 3, at 960.
90
See id.
91
See Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 242–43.
92
Id. at 243.
93
See David B. Wilkins, Is The In-House Counsel Movement Going Global?
A Preliminary Assessment of the Role of Internal Counsel in Emerging
Economies, 2012 WISC. L. REV. 251, 263–74 (citing Richard Stock, The Future
for In-House Counsel, INSIDER CORP. LEGAL, June 2008, at 1,
http://www.catalystlegal.com/Articles/ICL%20June%2008%20%20FINAL.pdf) (describing in-house legal departments as the “fastest-growing
legal services sector around the world over the last five years,” and how this trend
reflects a “compound increase of 15% per year”).
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Clearly, the duties, compensation, prestige, and popularity of inhouse counsel have fluctuated dramatically over the past century.94
This persistent fluctuation is likely to have had at least some role in
the inconsistency of court judgments on the issue of extending
attorney-client privilege over communications between in-house
counsel and their corporate clients.
III. THE DUAL FUNCTIONS OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
To better understand the divide among New York courts when
deciding how and when to extend privilege to communications
between in-house counsel and corporate clients, one must first
recognize the two principal functions that in-house counsel assume
in their duties to the corporation: (1) as a legal representative, and
(2) as a business and corporate advisor.95 Although theoretically
distinct, the reality is that in practice the two functions often blend
into one another in the course of in-house counsel’s daily
operations.96 The overlap of these two functions greatly contributes
to the difficulty New York courts have faced in resolving cases of
this nature and making uniform and consistent determinations as to
whether a given communication was made in the attorney’s function
as business advisor or as a legal representative.97 Before that
94

See DeMott, supra note 3, at 958–61; Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 238–43.
See Lipson et al., supra note 3, at 237–43; DeMott, supra note 3, at 957–60.
96
See DeMott, supra note 3, at 955 (“[A] general counsel’s roles include
furnishing legal advice to the corporation’s board of directors, chief executive
officer (“CEO”), and other senior executives. But a contemporary general counsel
often occupies other roles as well, each complex and interlinked in several
ways.”); Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielson, Cops, Counsel and
Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations,
34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 465 (2000).
97
See TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 214 F.R.D. 143, 144
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Application of th[e] [attorney-client privilege] . . . is
complicated in situations where communications claimed to be privileged involve
in-house as opposed to outside counsel because ‘in-house attorneys are more
likely to mix legal and business functions.’”) (citing Bank Brussels Lambert v.
Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y 2002)); Rossi
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 540 N.E.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. 1989);
Kim, supra note 20, at 240 (“At board meetings, the lawyer-director often
contributes a mixture of both legal and business advice. In that setting it may be
95
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problem can be resolved, the individual functions must be carefully
explored.
A. Legal Representative
Although it is common for in-house counsel to supplement their
role of legal representative with other corporate functions, the role
of legal representative remains the chief function of in-house
counsel.98 Indeed, “the most widely recognized and far-reaching
duty of contemporary [in-house] counsel is to provide legal advice
to officers, directors, and other constituents acting on behalf of
entities.”99 As part of the corporate structure, it is the in-house
attorney who “bears ultimate responsibility for all legal matters
affecting the corporation.”100 However, these legal matters are as
varied as the hundreds upon thousands of corporations that populate
the United States.101
The actual functions of in-house counsel’s role as legal advisor
depend upon “the size of the corporation and its in-house legal
department, as well as the complexity and nature of the legal and
regulatory questions that the corporation must address.”102 Further,
the type of legal representation and legal advice that in-house
counsel provides the corporate client differs greatly from the typical
attorney-client relationship.103 As described by one in-house counsel
at a commercial bank:

impossible for the lawyer-director and the other board members to distinguish
clearly between communications that constitute purely legal advice,
communications that constitute purely business advice, and communications that
involve a combination of the two. Unless those distinctions can be made, all of
the statements are potentially subject to compelled disclosure for failure to
classify them as legally-related confidential communications.”).
98
Nelson & Nielson, supra note 96, at 464–65.
99
Duggin, supra note 20, at 1003.
100
DeMott, supra note 3, at 965 (quoting Kim, supra note 20, at 200)
(internal quotations omitted).
101
See id.
102
Id.
103
See Nelson & Nielson, supra note 96, at 464 (“[T]he counsel role implies
a broader relationship with business actors that affords counsel an opportunity to
make suggestions based on business, ethical, and situational concerns.”).
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Forty percent of my time is spent managing the legal
position, . . . 20% of my time is as the bank’s chief
compliance officer: dealing with regulators,
overviewing the auditing process within the bank,
[overseeing] training done by the legal division . . . .
Another 30% of my time is as consigliere of
executive and senior management: I am the
counselor; I am the guy who is asked to draft letters;
to advise on particular issues, which can overlap with
the first two primarily because it relates to the
regulators . . . . The remaining 10% of my time I
practice law.104
As the statement above makes clear, legal advice rendered by inhouse counsel to its corporate client may address a wide variety of
issues, from those concerning solely internal matters, such as
corporate governance and management, to outside affairs, such as
regulatory matters and litigation.105
Even within its function as legal representative and legal
advisor, in-house counsel remains closely involved in directorial
decisions where counsel “draws on both legal and other forms of
knowledge, and . . . is highly influential.”106 These roles have
sometimes been referred to as “quasi-legal roles,”107 as they require
both legal and directorial skills.108 Nevertheless, even where the
function is effectively a “blend” of the two, distinctions can still be
drawn between which particular acts of in-house counsel are
characteristically those of a lawyer, and which are instead acts taken
as a business advisor, albeit one acting with the benefit of legal
knowledge and insight.109
104

Id. at 465.
Duggin, supra note 20, at 1003.
106
Nelson & Nielson, supra note 96, at 465.
107
Duggin, supra note 20, at 1010.
108
Id.
109
See Nelson & Nielson, supra note 96, at 465 (“[W]hen I think of
practicing law . . . it’s more taking a particular legal problem and finding out what
the law is, and then applying the law to the facts . . . That’s not what I do most of
the time when I am dealing with senior management . . . The law has very little to
do with it. An example would be, the regulators have found what they believe to
be a regulatory violation. Well, I’ve got either a member of my staff or outside
105
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It is at this juncture—where in-house counsel’s function as legal
representative merges with its function as a business and corporate
advisor—that the potential for problems arise. Despite the
practicality and utility of the merger of these two functions in the
daily business life of a corporation, it nonetheless causes great
confusion in litigation, and presents difficult challenges for a court
when asked to determine whether, and to what extent, the attorneyclient privilege will attach to communications made between inhouse counsel and its corporate client.110 Although some distinction
can still be made between the two functions, the line between the
business and legal functions of in-house counsel is very often a
blurry one.
B. Corporate Officer and Business Advisor
Aside from being the corporation’s legal representative and
advisor, in-house counsel wears many other nonlegal hats that
outside counsel would never wear in a typical attorney-client
relationship.111 For instance, “[in-house] counsel’s portfolio of
responsibilities may include nonlegal functions, including the
corporate secretarial, human resources, and governmental affairs
functions.”112 In addition, in-house counsel often serves as the
counsel who confer with me on whether it is or isn’t. That’s practicing law. My
consigliere role is how I am going to interface between the executive management
and the regulators to convince the regulators that it’s not [a violation]. And that
has nothing really to do with the law. It’s negotiating; its common sense . . . it’s
how it’s communicated.”); see also Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater
N.Y., 540 N.E.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. 1989) (evaluating a communication between
general counsel and their corporate client and noting that “[s]o long as the
communication is primarily or predominantly of a legal character, the privilege is
not lost merely by reason of the fact that it also refers to certain nonlegal matters”).
110
See TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 214 F.R.D. 143, 144
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 705; Kim, supra note 20, at 240; see also
8 WIGMORE, supra note 27, at 554 (stating that the attorney-client privilege
applies to communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from a
“professional legal adviser” acting in that capacity); Duggin, supra note 20, at
1016 (“The ability of the board to invoke the attorney-client privilege in seeking
legal advice from the general counsel is also imperiled when the general counsel
is a director.”).
111
See DeMott, supra note 3, at 967.
112
Id.
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corporation’s “chief compliance officer.”113 Moreover, “the role of
general counsel ranges from providing legal advice pertaining to
compliance functions to hiring compliance officers and briefing
senior managers and directors on compliance matters.”114
Further, “[m]any, perhaps most, [in-house] counsel are
corporate officers.”115 In this role, in-house counsel owes “fiduciary
allegiance to the corporation as officers.”116 Although subject to the
corporation’s bylaws,117 the duties owed by in-house counsel shift
dramatically where counsel takes on the function of corporate
officer.118 Specifically, the identity of the “client” changes from that
of only the corporation to the shareholders of the corporation, as
well as the corporation itself.119 Accordingly, duties that in-house
counsel owes to the corporate entity may drastically change upon
assuming the position of officer, and become—like other directors
and officers—duties owed to the shareholders themselves.120 Inhouse counsel also frequently serve as part of “corporate
management or executive committees,”121 and consequently
“participate in formulations of corporate strategy at the highest
levels of the management hierarchy.”122

113

Duggin, supra note 20, at 1011.
Id. at 1011–12.
115
Id. at 1014.
116
Id. 1015.
117
DeMott, supra note 3, at 967.
118
See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 1989) (“In taking action,
including . . . action which may involve or relate to a change or potential change
in the control of the corporation, a director shall be entitled to consider, . . . both
the long-term and . . . the short-term interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.” (emphasis added)); Pavel Leshchinskiy, Corporate Fiduciary
Duties, LEGAL MATCH (June 15, 2015), http://www.legalmatch.com/lawlibrary/article/corporate-fiduciary-duties.html; Joan M. Secofsky, Fiduciary
Duties in NY may not be in the Eyes of the Beholder, LAW 360 (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/476839/fiduciary-duties-in-ny-may-not-be-inthe-eyes-of-beholder.
119
See BUS. CORP. § 717(b); Leshchinskiy, supra note 118; Secofsky, supra
note 118.
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See BUS. CORP. § 717(b).
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Duggin, supra note 20, at 1015.
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DeMott, supra note 3, at 967.
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However, the function of business advisor also overlaps with the
function of legal representative.123 For example, “legal feasibility
and risk levels are critical factors in the calculus of whether or not
to proceed with new projects or redesign existing programs.”124
Another area in which the two functions may merge is within inhouse counsel’s role as a corporate director.125 While in-house
counsel can undoubtedly bring “a great deal of insight to a corporate
board as a result of his or her intimate familiarity with the
organization and sensitivity to the legal ramifications of business
matters,”126 in-house counsel serving as a director can tarnish the
independent role of legal advisor and become “entangled in conflicts
between the role of legal advisor and corporate decision maker.”127
Despite the utility of in-house counsel accepting dual roles
within the client corporation, the assumption of both roles may not
only cause confusion and unpredictability in New York courts, but
it may also hamper the corporate entity as a whole.128 While “[t]he
representation of a corporation as a nonhuman entity is already a
complex undertaking for lawyers . . . [i]t seems altogether imprudent
to complicate further the representation by allowing lawyers to
engage in dual service.”129 Further, “[d]ual service increases the risk
that confidential client communications relating to the provision of
legal services will no longer be protected by the attorney-client
privilege.”130 Due to in-house counsel’s multidisciplinary roles as
legal advisor, director, compliance officer, and other nonlegal
positions, it becomes difficult for the corporate client to show that
the communications at issue were strictly legal in nature and thus
entitled to attorney-client privilege.131
123

Duggin, supra note 20, at 1015.
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125
Id. at 1016.
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Id.
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Id.
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See Kim, supra note 20, at 260.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 239.
131
See Duggin, supra note 20, at 1016 (“The ability of the board to invoke
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Unless distinctions can be made among communications
comprised of legal advice, communications comprised of business
advice, and communications involving a mixture of both, all of inhouse counsels’ correspondence with its corporate client may be
subject to disclosure in the discovery process due to the “failure to
classify them as legally-related confidential communications.”132
This is not only detrimental to the corporation, but to in-house
counsel’s ability to perform any of the roles it takes on within the
corporation, whether legal or nonlegal.
IV. IN-HOUSE COUNSEL AND ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN NEW
YORK
New York courts have extended attorney-client privilege to
communications between the corporate client and in-house counsel
in several circumstances.133 However, communications between inhouse counsel and a corporate client are not protected merely
because in-house counsel is an attorney.134 Rather, when the
privilege applies to communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice from a “professional legal adviser” acting in that capacity).
132
Kim, supra note 20, at 240.
133
See Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 540 N.E.2d 703,
705–06 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that the privilege applied to communications
between defendant and its in-house counsel because counsel’s “communication
to his client was plainly made in the role of attorney” and counsel “was exercising
a lawyer’s traditional function in counseling his client regarding conduct that had
already brought it to the brink of litigation”); Polycast Technology Corp. v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[Counsel’s] status as
[defendant’s] in-house counsel is not of consequence for purposes of the privilege;
as he was a qualified attorney approached for legal advice, his role satisfies the
second element of the [attorney-client privilege] test.”); O’Brien v. Board of Ed.
of City Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y., 86 F.R.D. 548, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“The fact
that the document was authored by in-house counsel rather than by an independent
attorney is of no significance. The relevant inquiry is whether the attorney,
regardless of his place of employment, was acting as confidential counsel to the
party asserting the privilege. In this instance, the attorney was delivering
requested legal opinions in his response to questions propounded by his client.
The fact that the attorney and client had a common employer does not itself render
communications between the two ineligible for protection by the privilege.”).
134
See United Sates Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp., 852 F.
Supp. 156, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
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extension of privilege over communications between in-house
counsel and a corporate client is at issue, courts must distinguish
between situations where in-house counsel is functioning in a legal
capacity, as opposed to a business capacity.135 This has been a
difficult task for New York courts, as evidenced by their conflicting
decisions when presented with virtually the same set of facts and
legal issues.136 Indeed, when in-house counsel is “involved in issues
of attorney-client privilege, it can be difficult to determine if the
communication was legal or business in nature.”137
This is not a new issue.138 New York courts have been struggling
to develop a clear method of resolving how and when to apply
privilege to in-house counsel communications for the past several
decades.139 To properly explore this issue, it is best to begin with a
135

See Robert LoBue, Is It Privileged? Privilege Issues for In-House
Counsel, CORPORATE COUNSEL SECTION NEWSLETTER (New York State Bar
Association, Albany, N.Y.), Vol. 30, No. 1, Spring/Summer 2012, at 9, 11 (2012)
(stating that “[b]ecuse courts require a clear showing that counsel was acting in a
legal capacity, it is best to ensure that meetings, documents, and conversations
address only one of the counsel’s roles – either business or legal – and attend to
the other issues separately.”); Bass, Berry & Sims, Attorney/Client Privilege for
In-House
Counsel,
ASSOC. CORP. COUNS.
(July
14,
2011),
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/acpfihc.cfm (“Because the
privilege only applies to legal communications, it is critical to determine the
capacity in which an in-house counsel was acting when a particular
communication was made. While courts have provided some guidance in this
area . . . application of the law in a particular factual setting difficult can prove
difficult.”).
136
See Bass, Berry & Sims, supra note 135, at 1; Cooper-Rutter Assoc. v.
Anchor Nat. Life. Ins. Co., 563 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); ABB
Kent-Taylor, Inc. v. Stallings and Co., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 53, 56–57 (W.D.N.Y.
1996) .
137
PAUL R. RICE ET AL., 1 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW NEW
YORK § 3:14, Westlaw (last updated June 2016).
138
See generally Ford Motor Co. v. O.W. Burke Co., 299 N.Y.S.2d 946
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (showing that a corporation’s communication with its inhouse counsel has been an issue since 1969 where the Supreme Court of New
York held that it is, in fact, privileged); Cooper-Rutter Assoc., 563 N.Y.S.2d at
491 (showing that a New York Appellate Court in 1990 found that a corporation’s
communications with its in-house counsel was not shielded by attorney-client
privilege).
139
See, e.g., ABB Kent-Taylor, 172 F.R.D. at 56–57; Rossi v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 540 N.E.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. 1989) (discussing the
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historical approach that details the unique divergence that has
occurred in the holdings of New York courts, despite virtually
identical fact patterns. Where some courts opted to follow the
Whiting method and focus on the purpose of the communication
between in-house counsel and corporate client, other courts focus on
the content of the communication between in-house counsel and
corporate client.
A. Holdings Where Purpose of Privileged Communication
is Determinative
In 1969, the Supreme Court of New York in Ford Motor Co. v.
O.W. Burke Co. extended the attorney-client privilege to a
communication made between in-house counsel and its corporate
client, Ford Motor Company.140 The court rejected other modes of
resolving the issue of whether to extend the attorney-client privilege
to the communication between in-house counsel and its client,141
instead finding that the communications at issue were “part of the
data and information given as confidential communications . . . to
the plaintiff’s attorney . . . with a bona fide intention of being laid
before the lawyer for his legal analysis and advice.”142
In 1989, the New York Court of Appeals granted attorney-client
privilege over communications made by in-house counsel to the
corporate client in Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater New
York.143 In Rossi, in-house counsel to defendant Blue Cross prepared
an “internal memorandum” that consisted of a discussion of both
lack of a clear process through which this issue may be dealt with and stating
instead that the resolution of this issue is dependent on the individual facts of the
case at bar); Cooper-Rutter, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (demonstrating that, ten years
subsequent to Rossi, still no test existed to determine whether a communication
between in-house counsel and client was privileged or not); Stock v. Schnader
Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, 35 N.Y.S.3d 31, 33–36 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)
(relying on the 27 year-old Rossi decision, which held that the inquiry is factspecific, to determine whether the communication between in-house counsel and
client was privileged).
140
Ford Motor Co., 299 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
141
Id. at 948.
142
Id. at 949 (emphasis added) (quoting Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
18 F.R.D. 77, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)).
143
Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 703–04.
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legal issues and business matters.144 The memorandum discussed
“conversations between [in-house counsel] and plaintiff’s attorney
regarding a possible defamation suit . . . conversations between [inhouse counsel] and the FDA regarding plaintiff’s NMR Imaging
System . . . [in-house counsel’s] understanding of Blue Cross’s
NMR reimbursement policy . . . and [in-house counsel’s] opinion
and advice regarding the rejection language of the form.”145 To
resolve this matter, the Rossi court placed high importance on the
purpose behind communication made between in-house counsel and
its corporate client.146 Specifically, the court found that “[f]or the
privilege to apply when communications are made from client to
attorney, they must be made for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice.”147 The Rossi court also noted that “for the privilege to apply
when communications are made from attorney to client . . . they
must be made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal
advice or service.”148 The Rossi court employed a strict purposebased approach to resolving the issue at bar and, while noting the
limitations of a content-based approach,149 only looked at the
content of the communication to determine what the purpose behind
the communication was.150 After examining the purpose of the
document, specifically the legal purpose for which the document
was written, the court granted attorney-client privilege over inhouse counsel’s communication to its corporate client.151
Subsequently, in 1992, the New York Appellate Division,
Second Department, in Kraus v. Brandsetter extended the attorneyclient privilege to protect in-house counsel’s communications to its
144

See id. at 704.
Id.
146
See id. at 706.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. (“That the memorandum does not reflect legal research is not
determinative . . . So long as the communication is primarily or predominantly of
legal character, the privilege is not lost merely by reason of the fact that it also
refers to certain nonlegal matters.”).
150
Id. (“Here, it is plain from the content and context of the communication
that it was for the purpose of facilitating the lawyer’s rendition of legal advice to
his client.”).
151
Id.
145
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client.152 In doing so, the court cited Rossi and looked to the purpose
of the communication, rather than its content, to determine whether
the attorney-client privilege applied to the communication in
question.153 The court found that the communication was “presented
in order to provide a factual basis for the legal recommendations
contained therein,”154 and subsequently held that the attorney-client
privilege applied to protect the communication from discovery.155
In fact, the Kraus court explicitly refused to allow the content of the
communication to resolve the issue.156
In the 2002 decision of New York Times Newspaper Division v.
Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., the New York Appellate Division,
First Department, again looked to the purpose of the communication
at issue to determine whether the attorney-client privilege should
apply.157 Although in its analysis the New York Times court
reviewed the content of the communication at issue,158 the
determinative factor that the court relied upon was the purpose for
which the communication was made.159 The court found that the
purpose of the communication here was to respond to “oral requests
152

Kraus v. Brandstetter, 586 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
Id.
154
Id. (emphasis added).
155
Id.
156
Id. (“Although the Supreme Court appears to have been influenced by the
statement of facts set forth in the reports, a recital of facts in a legal opinion does
not defeat the attorney-client privilege.”).
157
See N.Y. Times Newspaper Div. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 752
N.Y.S.2d 642, 644–45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
158
The Court noted that:
The [communication at issue] satisfies all the essential elements
of a protected attorney-client communication . . . . The
[communication at issue] contained information and analysis
with regard to litigation threatened by The Times, including
opinions and conclusions of Parsons’ employees concerning
possible causes of the alleged problems that were the bases of
The Times’ threatened lawsuit.
Id. at 645.
159
Id. at 644–45. “The privilege applies to communications from the client
to the attorney when the communication is ‘made for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice.’” Id. at 645 (quoting Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater
N.Y., 540 N.E.2d 704, 706 (N.Y. 1989)).
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by attorneys”160 and “[a]s such, it was protected by the attorneyclient privilege and absolutely immune from discovery.”161
Even today, some courts in New York still rely upon the purpose
of the communication at issue to determine whether the attorneyclient privilege shall apply.162 In the recent case of Stock v. Schnader
Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, decided on June 30, 2016, the New
York Appellate Division, First Department, held that attorneys who
have sought the advice of their law firm’s in-house counsel may
invoke attorney-client privilege to avoid disclosure thereof.163 The
First Department relied on Rossi and found that “[i]n the corporate
context, the Court of Appeals has recognized that the attorney-client
privilege applies to communications between a corporation’s
employees and the corporation’s in-house counsel for the purpose
of providing legal advice to the corporation.”164
The aforementioned cases demonstrate that for the past several
decades, each level of the New York State court system has
continued to rely on the purpose of the communication at issue,
rather than its content, to determine whether attorney-client
privilege extends to communications made between in-house
counsel and its corporate client. Despite the apparent sensibility of
this approach, it completes only half of the inquiry necessary to
appropriately determine whether the communication constitutes
mere business advice or whether the communication contains legal
advice that should be protected from adversarial discovery.
B. Holdings Where Content of Privileged Communication
is Determinative
Despite some courts choosing to rely more heavily on the
purpose of the communication at issue to determine whether the
attorney-client privilege applies to a communication made between
in-house counsel and corporate client, other courts have opted to
focus on the content of the privileged communication to determine
160

Id.
Id.
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See Stock v. Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, 35 N.Y.S.3d 31, 33
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
163
Id. at 38.
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Id. at 35.
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464

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

whether the attorney-client privilege applies.165 In Cooper-Rutter
Associates, Inc. v. Anchor National Life Insurance Co., the New
York Appellate Division, Second Department, refused to extend
privilege to documents similar to those at issue in Rossi.166 The case
began when Cooper-Rutter Associates, Inc. brought suit against
Anchor National Life Insurance Company (“Anchor”) alleging that
Anchor breached a contract for sale of a “cable television
system.”167 In response to the complaint, Anchor’s in-house counsel
prepared “two handwritten memoranda” that were distributed to the
corporate client.168 Akin to Rossi, the court in Cooper-Rutter made
explicit note of the dual-nature of the handwritten memoranda
prepared by Anchor’s in-house counsel.169 Rather than focus on the
purpose of the memoranda, the court looked to the content of the
communication at issue to determine whether the attorney-client
privilege would apply.170 The court found that “[t]he
documents . . . concern both the business and legal aspects of the
defendants’ ongoing negotiations with the plaintiff,”171 and further
concluded that the content of the communication “expressed
substantial nonlegal concerns,” and for this reason, held that the
attorney-client privilege did not apply.172 Nowhere in the court’s
analysis was the purpose of the communication considered.173
In 2003, the Stenovich court focused primarily on the content of
the advice rendered by in-house counsel to its corporate client, just

165

See, e.g., Cooper-Rutter Assoc. v. Anchor Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 563
N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (relying on the nonlegal content of a
communication between in-house counsel and client to hold that the
communication was not privileged).
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Id.; see Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 540 N.E.2d
703, 705 (N.Y. 1989).
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799, 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (transferred from 2d Dep’t.).
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as the Cooper-Rutter court did more than ten years prior.174 While
not explicitly stating that the content of the communications dictated
its holding on the matter, the Stenovich court nonetheless took a
four-corners approach to the issue by focusing on the language of
the advice given in the communications rather than their purpose.
Specifically, the Stenovich court stated that the attorney-client
privilege applies to communications made between in-house
counsel and corporate client where “the advice given is
predominantly legal, as opposed to business, in nature.”175 Finding
that the communications at issue possessed such a legal “nature,”
the Stenovich court ultimately held that the communications “are
primarily of a legal character and are therefore potentially protected
absent any exception to the attorney-client privilege.”176
Most recently, in National Casualty Company v. American
Home Assurance Company, the Supreme Court of New York looked
only at the content of the communication made between in-house
counsel and their corporate client in order to resolve the issue of
whether to extend the attorney-client privilege over said
communication.177 The court found that “[a]t no time do these claim
notes reiterate a legal analysis or legal advice . . . the details of those
discussions [with in-house counsel] are not written on these claim
notes.”178 Moreover, the court noted that “[m]erely because . . . in
house counsel’s name appears on a claim note does not give rise to
the attorney-client privilege.”179 The court did not once consider the
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Compare Cooper-Rutter Assoc., 563 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (holding that,
because the communication at issue expressed “substantial nonlegal concerns,” it
was not privileged material), with Stenovich v. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
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purpose behind the communication at issue, but rather resolved the
issue at bar by examining only the content of the communication.180
As these cases demonstrate, there remains a very real and
palpable divergence in the methods used by New York State courts
to resolve the issue of determining when in-house counsel—or even
private counsel—is acting as a business advisor as opposed to a legal
advisor or representative.
V. SOLUTIONS
Several measures would serve the salutary purpose of reducing
the unpredictability of the present decisional law in New York and
providing a more efficient and secure relationship between in-house
counsel and corporate clients. The first, and perhaps more important,
part of the solution is a proposed synthesis of two long and
prominent lines of divergent precedent in New York, a dichotomy
which has greatly contributed to the gross bifurcation of opinions
and results on this issue. The second piece of the solution aims to
more clearly distinguish actions taken by in-house counsel in its
capacity as legal representative for its corporate client, versus those
actions in-house counsel takes in its role as a corporate advisor or in
an otherwise nonlegal capacity. Specifically, the two solutions that
stand as the focus of the foregoing analysis are: (1) legislative
adoption of an ordered two-step process to determine whether
privilege should be extended to in-house counsel’s communications
with its corporate client, essentially a synthesis by which courts
would analyze both the intended purpose of the communication, as
well as the content of that communication; and (2) as a separate
measure, in-house counsel and corporate client’s use of a deliberate
signal (such as a particular e-mail address or letterhead) to denote
communications that pertain to in-house counsel’s function as a
legal representative or legal advisor rather than a corporate advisor
or officer.
For more than a century, New York courts have struggled to
distinguish between situations where in-house counsel functions as
legal advisor or legal representative, and situations where in-house

180

See id.

WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT 467
counsel functions as a business advisor or corporate officer,181 and
little progress has been made toward finding a solution.182 However,
several notable legal scholars have proposed solutions to this
issue.183 In her article entitled Dual Identities and Dueling
Obligations:
Preserving
Independence
in
Corporate
Representation, Susanna M. Kim proposed that the dual function of
in-house counsel be prohibited altogether.184 Kim asserts that this
dual-role “complicate[s] further the [in-house counsel’s legal]
representation by allowing lawyers to engage in dual service.”185 As
support for her solution, Kim noted that “[l]awyers who attempt to
fill both roles simultaneously risk a loss of professional
independence that can impair their ability to perform either role
well.”186 However, Kim’s solution fails to consider that the dualrole structure of in-house counsel duties did not occur by chance.187
The increase in the amount of in-house counsel duties is a direct
result of the realization of corporations’ intentions to internalize
legal costs,188 the increased government regulations on large
corporations engaging in specific industries of the economy,189 and
the influx in the amount of lawyers practicing corporate law and
applying for in-house counsel positions.190 Due to the tremendous
force that these external factors have on the functions of in-house
counsel, it is difficult to imagine that the dual-role nature of in-house
counsel will ever cease entirely. For this reason, the two solutions
identified above should be implemented to clarify, rather than curb,
181
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the performance of in-house counsel in these dual roles so that courts
can better identify these functions and more appropriately apply the
doctrine of attorney-client privilege.
As previously noted, New York courts have either focused
primarily on the content,191 or primarily on the purpose,192 of the
communication that is the subject of a privilege claim. By doing so,
New York State courts have only been fulfilling half of the
appropriate inquiries that should occur when this issue is presented.
This imbalance calls for a solution that reconciles the divergent
methods of reasoning taken by New York State courts when
confronted with the question of when privilege should be applied to
in-house counsel communications. Instead of isolating the analyses
as separate approaches, courts should use both approaches to
achieve a more holistic, fair, and judicious understanding of both
why the communication was made—analyzing its purpose—as well
191

See, e.g., Cooper-Rutter Assoc., v. Anchor Nat. Life Ins. Co., 563
N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (relying on the fact that the content of
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Ct. 1969) (holding that privilege applied to the communications at issue because
they were “part of the data and information given as confidential
communications . . . to the plaintiff’s attorney . . . with the bona fide intention of
being . . . legal analysis and advice”); Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Greater N.Y., 540 N.E.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that “for the privilege to
apply when communications are made from attorney to client . . . they must be
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal advice or service”);
Kraus v. Brandstetter, 586 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (1992) (holding that because the
communication at issue was “presented in order to provide a factual basis for the
legal recommendations contained therein,” the communication was privileged);
N.Y. Times Newspaper Div. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 752 N.Y.S.2d 642,
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communication was to respond to “oral requests by attorneys”, the
communication was “protected by the attorney-client privilege and absolutely
immune from discovery”).
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as what the communication itself consisted of —analyzing its
content.
It is the province and duty of the courts to interpret and construe
State or Federal statutes, and statutes often provide a procedural and
substantive guide that the courts can follow when making their
determination regarding the issue at bar.193 For this reason, the best
application of this solution would be through statute. Of course, a
court can also unilaterally adopt this procedure to resolve this issue.
Thus, the first solution is legislative adoption of a two-prong
requirement that grants attorney-client privilege to protect
communications made between in-house counsel and corporate
client only where:
(1) The communication is made for the purpose of
rendering legal advice, legal consultation, or is
otherwise made in counsel’s capacity as legal
advisor; and
(2) The content of the communication consists of
legal advice, legal consultation, or other legal
analysis that is executed by counsel in his capacity as
legal advisor.
This approach recognizes the chief concerns and considerations
of both lines of New York precedent: the purpose of the
communication and the content of the communication. In doing so,
it reconciles the two lines of precedent into one holistic formula that
results in a more complete understanding of the communication at
issue.
It should be noted that this solution is far from perfect. Indeed,
some communications may be not be made for the purpose of
rendering legal advice, but may still contain sensitive legal
consultation that, if unprotected, may work to the client’s detriment.
However, this solution does not aim to protect every in-house
counsel-corporate client communication, but rather focuses on
clarifying for the courts the point at which in-house counsel is acting
193
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in its legal capacity in such a manner that privilege is warranted.
This process ensures that communications with both a legal purpose
and legal content will remain privileged and, as such, shielded from
discovery.
In addition to the solution explained above, another proposed
solution to help courts determine whether a communication was
made for the purpose of rendering legal advice is for in-house
counsel and their corporate client to use a particular signal to mark
communications that pertain to a legal purpose, as opposed to
communications that have a business, or otherwise nonlegal,
purpose. In today’s corporate environment, “[e-]mail is widely used
as a form of business communication.”194 This solution can be best
applied in the form of specific e-mail addresses used by in-house
counsel and corporate clients solely for the purposes of legal advice
and consultation. This solution is especially effective because it
makes clear the purpose behind the communication made between
in-house counsel and the corporate client. For example, if the
designated “legal advice only” e-mail addresses are used to
communicate, the court will effectively be put on notice that such
communication was intended for the purpose of rendering or
receiving legal advice. The use of a specific e-mail address between
in-house counsel and their corporate client for rendering or
receiving legal, or otherwise privileged advice, can be a simple and
cost-effective way to make clear to both courts and corporate
employees whether a communication is done with a legal or
business purpose.
It is important to note that this solution is not a perfect one.
Indeed, under this proposed solution, in-house counsel would be
encouraged to label every communication as one sent with the
purpose of rendering legal advice. However, knowingly labeling a
business communication as legal advice would likely be a violation
of Rule 8.4(c) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct,195
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and may result in sanctions.196 Thus, although the solution is not
foolproof, there are rules in place aimed to discourage violation
thereof.
In an effort to provide clarity as to the purpose of the
communications between in-house counsel and a client, this solution
takes what is already an inexpensive tool,197 and turns it into an
extremely beneficial cost-saving device. Between 2000 and 2008,
the total litigation costs of Fortune 200 companies ranged from an
average of $66,395,673 in 2000 to $114,908,977 in 2008.198
Moreover, “litigation costs have grown nine percent per year.”199 As
stated above, a key consideration that courts make when evaluating
this issue is for what purpose the communication was made.200
Indeed, a failure to demonstrate a legal purpose behind a
communication can be a complete bar to privilege.201 This solution
helps make vividly clear to both the court and corporate employees
that a communication was made for the purpose of rendering and/or
receiving legal advice, rather than business advice. Accordingly,
this solution would help to avoid extensive litigation on the matter
for the corporate client and the costs that come therewith.
196
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CONCLUSION
To fix the broader issue of diverging judgments in New York
regarding the extension of attorney-client privilege to in-house
counsel, one must begin by addressing the root of the issue, namely
the struggle New York State courts have faced when they are forced
to distinguish between functions that in-house counsel have as a
legal advisor, compared with those that in-house counsel have in a
business, or otherwise nonlegal capacity. While it is likely that this
dual-role function of in-house counsel will continue to exist in the
foreseeable future, efforts can still be made to clarify the point at
which in-house counsel is acting in its capacity as legal advisor, as
opposed to when in-house counsel is acting in its capacity as
business advisor, corporate officer, or in some other nonlegal
capacity.
New York State courts should reconsider and reevaluate the way
in which they have extended the doctrine of attorney-client privilege
to cases involving in-house counsel. Rather than continue down a
conflicting and contradictory path where purpose or content is
analyzed, courts should consider ways by which these two divergent
lines of precedent can be reconciled. Adopting a method of
reasoning that unifies both the purpose and content modes of
analysis, as well as using a signal to denote privileged
communication, could effectively be a means to this end. These
solutions help to alleviate the struggle that has been plaguing New
York courts for many years now, and are an extremely cost-efficient
way of doing so. Neither the practice of hiring in-house counsel, nor
the need to protect privilege documents from adversarial discovery
will fade any time soon. Thus, it is important to take steps now to
address and simplify the means by which courts deal with these
issues and hopefully achieve a result that equally benefits counsel,
client, and judge alike.

